Influence of family involvement in management and ownership on firm performance: Evidence from Poland

Family Business Review

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 45-59

  Kowalewski, Oskar ^a   Talavera, Oleksandr ^b   Stetsyuk, Ivan ^c  

^a WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

^c TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Family firms; Firm performance; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649241790     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: 17416248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0894486509355803     Document Type: Article

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