The effects of parental altruism on the governance of family-managed firms

Journal of Organizational Behavior

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 313-330

  Lubatkin, Michael H ^a   Schulze, William S ^b   Ling, Yan ^c   Dino, Richard N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744432326     PISSN: 08943796     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/job.307     Document Type: Review

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