Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 273-299

  Tan, Guofu ^a   Wang, Ruqu ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Binding agreements; Coalition formation; Continuing conflict; Rivalry

Indexed keywords

EID: 77149126404     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0203-4     Document Type: Article

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