Endogenous formation of joint ventures with efficiency gains

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 610-631

  Yi, Sang Seung ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032360071     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556107     Document Type: Article

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