All-pay auctions-an experimental study

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 255-275

  Gneezy, Uri ^a   Smorodinsky, Rann ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

All pay; Auction; Nash equilibrium; Revenue; Symmetric Logit equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748956161     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013     Document Type: Article

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