Contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 533, 2008, Pages 2047-2059

  Baharad, Eyal ^a   Nitzan, Shmuel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HOMOGENEITY; RENT CONTROL; RENT SEEKING; RENTAL SECTOR; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 54049100399     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02201.x     Document Type: Article

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