Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 213-239

  Amegashie, J Atsu ^a   Cadsby, C Bram ^a   Song, Yang ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

Author keywords

All pay auction; Burning out; Coalition proof Nash equilibrium; Cognitive hierarchy; Contests; Experiment; Step thinking

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248549858     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.009     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Amaldoss, W., Rapoport, A., 2005. Excessive expenditure in two-stage contests: Theory and experimental evidence. Unpublished manuscript. Duke University
2. Amegashie J.A. Burning out in sequential-elimination contests. Unpublished manuscript. http://www.uoguelph.ca/~jamegash/Burning_out.pdf
3. Anderson S.P., Goeree J.K., and Holt C.A. Rent seeking with bounded rationality. J. Polit. Economy 106 (1998) 828-853
4. Anderson S.P., Goeree J.K., and Holt C.A. Minimum effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 34 (2001) 177-199
5. Baye M.R., Kovenock D., and de Vries C.G. The all-pay auction with complete information. Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 291-305
6. Bernheim B.D., Peleg B., and Whinston M.D. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I: Concepts. J. Econ. Theory 42 (1987) 1-12
7. Berninghaus S.K., Erhart K.-M., and Keser C. Conventions and local interaction structures: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 34 (2002) 177-205
8. Binmore K. Modelling rational players: Part II. Econ. Philosophy 4 (1988) 9-55
9. Camerer C. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (2003), Russell Sage Foundation/Princeton Univ. Press, New York/Princeton
10. Camerer C., and Ho T. Experience-weighted attraction learning in games: Estimates from weak-link games. In: Budescu D., Erev I., and Zwick R. (Eds). Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport (1999), Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ 31-52
11. Camerer C., and Knez M. Creating "expectational assets" in the laboratory: "Weakest link" coordination games. Strategic Manage. J. 15 (1994) 101-119
12. Camerer C.F., Ho T.-H., and Chong J.-K. A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results. http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/thinking2002.pdf
13. Camerer C.F., Ho T.-H., and Chong J.-K. A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quart. J. Econ. 119 (2004) 861-897
14. Che Y.K., and Gale I. Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained. Public Choice 92 (1997) 109-126
15. Che Y.K., and Gale I. Caps on political lobbying. Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 643-651
16. Clark D.J., and Riis C. Competition over more than one prize. Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 276-289
17. Costa-Gomes M., Crawford V., and Broseta B. Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study. Econometrica 69 (2001) 1193-1235
18. Dufwenberg M., and Gneezy U. Information disclosure in auctions: An experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 48 (2002) 431-444
19. Garratt R., Parco J.E., Qin C.-Z., and Rapoport A. Potential maximization and coalition formation. Int. Game Theory Rev. 7 (2005) 407-429
20. Gavious A., Moldovanu B., and Sela A. Bid costs and endogenous bid caps. RAND J. Econ. 33 (2002) 709-722
21. Gillette A.B., Noe T.H., and Rebello M.J. Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence. J. Finance 58 (2003) 1997-2031
22. Gillette, A.B., Noe, T.H. Rebello, M.J., 2004. Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation. Working paper. Tulane University
23. Harsanyi J.C., and Selten R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
24. Ho T.-K., Camerer C.F., and Weigelt K. Iterated dominance and iterated best response in p-beauty contests. Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 947-969
25. Johnson E.J., Camerer C., Sen S., and Rymon T. Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining. J. Econ. Theory 104 (2002) 16-47
26. Moldovanu B., and Sela A. The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 542-558
27. Moldovanu B., and Sela A. Contest architecture. J. Econ. Theory 126 (2006) 70-97
28. Nagel R. Unravelling in guessing games: An experimental study. Amer. Econ. Rev. 85 (1995) 1313-1326
29. Neugebauer, T., Selten, R., 2003. Individual behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions: The importance of feedback in experimental markets. Discussion paper No. 3/2003. University of Bonn
30. Ockenfels A., and Selten R. Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 51 (2005) 155-170
31. Parco J.E., Rapoport A., and Amaldoss W. Two-stage contests with budget constraints: An experimental study. J. Math. Psych. 49 (2005) 320-338
32. Rapoport A., and Amaldoss W. Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 54 (2004) 585-607
33. Raudenbush S.W., and Bryk A.S. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods. second ed (2002), Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
34. Schelling T. The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA
35. Selten R. Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality. Europ. Econ. Rev. 42 (1998) 413-436
36. Snijders T., and Bosker R. Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling (1999), Sage, London
37. Stahl D.O. Is step-j thinking an arbitrary modeling restriction or a fact of human nature?. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 37 (1998) 33-51
38. Stahl D.O., and Wilson P. On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 213-254
39. Van Huyck J.B., Battalio R.C., and Beil R. Tacit cooperation games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80 (1990) 234-248
40. Van Huyck J.B., Battalio R.C., and Beil R. Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Quart. J. Econ. 106 (1991) 885-909
41. Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., Rankin, F.W., 2001. Evidence on learning in coordination games. Unpublished manuscript. Texas A & M University