Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 6-7, 2006, Pages 1073-1114

  Klumpp, Tilman ^a   Polborn, Mattias K ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Political campaigns; Primaries

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748030415     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.009     Document Type: Article

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