Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 309-328

  Stein, William E ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444599587     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2050-6     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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