Judicial branch, checks and balances and political accountability

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 47-70

  Padovano, Fabio ^a,d   Sgarra, Grazia ^b   Fiorino, Nadia ^c  

^a ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^b Centro Studi Confindustria   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF L'AQUILA   (Italy)

^d Dipto di Ist Politic/Sci Sociali   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043102559     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022347908667     Document Type: Conference Paper

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