Explaining de facto judicial independence

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 269-290

  Hayo, Bernd ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^a  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Formal institutions; Informal institutions; Judicial independence

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148830694     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.004     Document Type: Article

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