Choosing not to choose: When politicians choose to delegate powers

Kyklos

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 289-310

  Voigt, Stefan ^a   Salzberger, Eli M ^b  

^a RUHR UNIVERSITY BOCHUM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POWER RELATIONS;

EID: 0036097919     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00187     Document Type: Article

References (45)

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