The effect of judicial institutions on uncertainty and the rate of litigation: The election versus appointment of state judges

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 205-

  Andrew Hanssen, F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345985818     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/468050     Document Type: Article

References (2)

1. Phillip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges, 40 Sw. L. J. 31 (1986).
2. Elliot Slotnick writes that the focal point in this debate is "the balance that a particular selection method strikes between the values of accountability of American judges, arguably maximized in electorally based selection systems, and judicial independence and expertise, arguably best served by appointive selection systems." See Elliot E. Slotnick, Review Essay on Judicial Recruitment and Selection, 13 Just. Sys. J. 109 (1988). Appointed judges rely less on political parties, serve longer terms, and keep office for longer (more on this in Sec