CoSP: A general framework for computational soundness proofs

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 66-78

  Backes, Michael ^a   Hofheinz, Dennis ^b   Unruh, Dominique ^a  

^a SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b CWI   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Security; Theory; Verification

Indexed keywords

ACTIVE ATTACK; ARBITRARY EQUATIONAL THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL IMPLEMENTATIONS; COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES; DIGITAL SIGNATURE; FORMAL CALCULI; INTERNAL STRUCTURE; MESSAGE SCHEDULING; PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION; SECURITY; SECURITY THEORY; SYMBOLIC MODEL;

BIOMINERALIZATION; CALCULATIONS; NETWORK SECURITY; PATHOLOGY; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 74049100112     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1653662.1653672     Document Type: Conference Paper

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