Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 26-35

  Laud, Peeter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TARTU   (Estonia)

Author keywords

Simulatability; Type systems

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES; COMPUTER SIMULATION; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA; SEMANTICS;

ASYMMETRIC COMMUNICATION; PFITZMANN-WAIDNER LIBRARY; SIMULATABILITY; TYPE SYSTEMS;

PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 33745787443     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1102120.1102126     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (48)

1. M. Abadi. Secrecy by Typing in Security Protocols. Journal of the ACM, 46(5):749-786, Sept. 1999.
2. M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Secrecy types for asymmetric communication. Theoretical Computer Science, 298(3):387-413, 2003.
3. M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Analyzing Security Protcols with Secrecy Types and Logic Programs. Journal of the ACM, 52(1):102-146, Jan. 2003.
4. M. Abadi and A. Gordon. A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus. Information and Computation, 148(1):1-70, Jan. 1999.
5. M. Abadi and J. Jürjens. Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation. In proc. of TACS 2001 (LNCS 2215), pages 82-94.
6. M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption). In proc. of International Conference IFIP TCS 2000 (LNCS 1872) pages 3-22.
7. M. Backes. A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the Otway-Rees Protocol. In proc. of ESORICS 2004 (LNCS 3193) pages 89-108.
8. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann, A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol. In proc. of FST TCS 2003 (LNCS 2914), pages 1-12.
9. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library. In proc. of IEEE CSFW 2004, pages 204-218.
10. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy. In proc. of IEEE S&P 2005.
11. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Symmetric authentication within a simulatable cryptographic library. In proc. of ESORICS 2003 (LNCS 2808), pages 271-290.
12. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. A Universally Composable Cryptographic Library. In proc. of ACM CCS 2003, pages 220-230.
13. M. Bellare, A. Desai, E. Jokipii, and P. Rogaway. A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption. In proc, of FOCS 1997, pages 394-403.
14. M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway, Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes. In proc of. CRYPTO '98 (LNCS 1462), pages 26-43.
15. B. Blanchet. Automatic Proof of Strong Secrecy for Security Protocols. In proc. of IEEE S&P 2004, pages 86-100.
16. R. Canetti. Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols. In proc. of FOCS 2001, pages 136-145.
17. R. Canetti and M. Fischlin. Universally Composable Commitments. In proc. of CRYPTO 2001 (LNCS 2139), pages 19-40.
18. R. Canetti and J. Herzog. Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols (The case of encryption-based mutual authentication and key exchange). Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/334, 22 Feb. 2005.
19. R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk, Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels. In proc. of EUROCRYPT 2002 (LNCS 2332), pages 337-331.
20. R. Canetti, Y. Lindell, R. Ostrovsky, and A. Sahai. Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation. In proc. of STOC 2002, pages 494-303.
21. V. Cottier and B. Warinschi. Computationally Sound, Automated Proofs for Security Protocols. In proc. of ESOP 2005 (LNCS 3444), pages 157-171.
22. D. Dolev and A. Yao. On the security of public key protocols, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-29(12):198-208, Mar. 1983.
23. O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography (Basic Tools). Cambridge University Press, 2001.
24. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, Probabilistic Encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 28(2):270-299, Apr. 1984.
25. A. D. Gordon and A. Jeffrey. Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 11(4):431-520, 2003.
26. A. D. Gordon and A. Jeffrey, Typing correspondence assertions for communication protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 300(1-3):379-409.
27. A. D. Gordon and A. Jeffrey. Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 12(3-4):435-483, 2004.
28. J. Guttman, F. Thayer, and L. Zuck. The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication. In proc. of ACM CCS 2001, pages 186-195.
29. J. Herzog, M. Liskov, and S. Micali. Plaintext Awareness via Key Registration. In proc. of CRYPTO 2003 (LNCS 2729), pages 548-564.
30. R. Janvier, Y. Lakhnech, and L. Mazaré. Completing the Picture: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Active Adversaries. In proc. of ESOP 2003 (LNCS 3444), pages 172-185.
31. R. Janvier, Y. Lakhnech, and L. Mazaré (De)Compositions of Cryptographic Schemes and their Applications to Protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/020, 1 Feb. 2005.
32. P. Laud. Handling Encryption in Analyses for Secure Information Flow. In proc. of ESOP 2003 (LNCS 2618), pages 159-173.
33. P. Laud. Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In proc. of IEEE S&P 2004, pages 71-85.
34. P. Laud. Secrecy Types for a Simulatable Cryptographic Library. Research Report IT-LU-O-162-050823, Cybernetica, Aug. 2005.
35. P. Laud and V. Vene. A Type System for Computationally Secure Information Flow. In proc. of FCT 2005 (LNCS 3623), pages 365-377.
36. P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. A Probabilistic Poly-Time Framework for Protocol Analysis. In proc. of ACM CCS '98, pages 112-121.
37. P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Equivalence and Security Analysis. In proc. of FM '99 (LNCS 1708), pages 776-793.
38. G. Lowe. Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR. In proc. of TACAS '96 (LNCS 1055), pages 147-166.
39. C. Meadows. Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis: Emerging Issues and Trends. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, 21(1):44-54, Jan. 2003.
40. D. Micciancio and S. Panjwani. Adaptive Security of Symbolic Encryption. In proc. of TCC 2005 (LNCS 3378), pages 169-187.
41. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Completeness theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway logic of encrypted expressions. In Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security - WITS 2002, Portland, Oregon, Jan. 2002.
42. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Active Adversaries. In proc. TCC 2004 (LNCS 2951), pages 133-151.
43. R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers. Communications of the ACM, 21(12):993-999, Dec. 1978.
44. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission. In IEEE S&P 2001, pages 184-200.
45. C. Rackoff and D. R. Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In proc. of CRYPTO '91 (LNCS 576), pages 433-444.
46. A. Ramanathan, J. C. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. Probabilistic Bisimulation and Equivalence for Security Analysis of Network Protocols. In proc. of FOSSACS 2004 (LNCS 2987), pages 468-483.
47. A. Yao. Theory and applications of trapdoor functions (extended abstract). In proc. of FOCS '82, pages 80-91.
48. R. Zunino and P. Degano. A Note on the Perfect Encryption Assumption in a Process Calculus. In proc. of FOSSACS 2004 (LNCS 2987), pages 514-528.