Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2951, Issue , 2004, Pages 133-151

  Micciancio, Daniele ^a   Warinschi, Bogdan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CARRY LOGIC; COMPUTATION THEORY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

ASYMPTOTIC NOTATION; COMPUTATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS; COMPUTATIONAL MODEL; COMPUTATIONAL SETTINGS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; DOLEV-YAO ADVERSARY; LOGIC-BASED LANGUAGES; PROBABILISTIC POLYNOMIAL TIME;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 35048899313     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24638-1_8     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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