Symmetric authentication within a simulatable cryptographic library

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2808, Issue , 2003, Pages 271-290

  Backes, Michael ^a   Pfitzmann, Birgit ^a   Waidner, Michael ^a  

^a IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK SECURITY; SEMANTICS;

CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES; CRYPTOGRAPHIC SEMANTICS; CRYPTOGRAPHICS; DOLEV-YAO MODEL; LARGE PARTS; PROVABLY SECURE; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; SIMPLE++; SYMMETRICS;

AUTHENTICATION;

EID: 0142250274     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_16     Document Type: Conference Paper

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