Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3580, Issue , 2005, Pages 16-29

  Datta, Anupam ^a   Derek, Ante ^a   Mitchell, John C ^a   Shmatikov, Vitaly ^b   Turuani, Mathieu ^c  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c INRIA   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; POLYNOMIALS; SECURITY OF DATA; SEMANTICS;

ASYMPTOTIC COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIAL-TIME SEMANTICS; SYMBOLIC EVALUATION; TECHNICAL PROBLEMS;

LOGIC PROGRAMMING;

EID: 26444565771     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11523468_2     Document Type: Conference Paper

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