Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4337 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 176-187

  Cortier, Véronique ^a   Kremer, Steve ^b   Küsters, Ralf ^c   Warinschi, Bogdan ^a  

^a INRIA   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

^c ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SOFTWARE ENGINEERING;

DECISION PROCEDURE; PUBLIC KEYS; RANDOM ORACLE; SECURITY NOTION;

HASH FUNCTIONS;

EID: 84962447835     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11944836_18     Document Type: Conference Paper

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