Cryptographically sound theorem proving

Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 153-166

  Sprenger, Christoph ^a   Basin, David ^a   Backes, Michael ^b   Pfitzmann, Birgit ^c   Waidner, Michael ^c  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^c IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA; THEOREM PROVING;

BLACKBOX; SECURITY PROPERTIES; SECURITY PROTOCOLS;

ACOUSTIC SIGNAL PROCESSING;

EID: 33947656534     PISSN: 10636900     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.10     Document Type: Conference Paper

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