A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 15-29

  Blanchet, Bruno ^a  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA; THEOREM PROVING;

AUTHENTICATION CODES; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; GENERIC METHOD;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 33751067991     PISSN: 10816011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/SP.2006.1     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (46)

1. M. Abadi and J. Jürjens. Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In TACS'01, volume 2215 of LNCS, pages 82-94. Springer, Oct. 2001.
2. M. Abadi and R. Needham. Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 22(1):6-15, Jan. 1996.
3. M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption). Journal of Cryptology, 15(2): 103-127, 2002.
4. M. Abdalla, P.-A. Fouque, and D. Pointcheval. Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting. In PKC'05, volume 3386 of LNCS, pages 65-84. Springer, Jan. 2005.
5. P. Adão, G. Bana, J. Herzog, and A. Scedrov. Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of key-cycles. In ESORICS'05, volume 3679 of LNCS, pages 374-396. Springer, Sept. 2005.
6. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Symmetric encryption in a simulatable Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library. In 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, June 2004.
7. M. Backes and B. Pfitzmann. Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy. In 26th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 171-182. IEEE, May 2005.
8. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. A composable cryptographic library with nested operations. In CCS'03, pages 220-230. ACM, Oct. 2003.
9. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Symmetric authentication within a simulatable cryptographic library. In ESORICS 2003, volume 2808 of LNCS, pages 271-290. Springer, Oct. 2003.
10. G. Barthe, J. Cederquist, and S. Tarento. A machine-checked formalization of the generic model and the random oracle model. In IJCAR'04, volume 3097 of LNCS, pages 385-399. Springer, July 2004.
11. M. Baudet, V. Cortier, and S. Kremer. Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries. In ICALP'05, volume 3580 of LNCS, pages 652-663. Springer, July 2005.
12. M. Bellare, A. Desai, E. Jokipii, and P. Rogaway. A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. In FOCS'97, pages 394-403. IEEE, Oct. 1997. Full paper available at http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/ mihir/papers/sym-enc. html.
13. M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway. Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '98, volume 1462 of LNCS, pages 26-45. Springer, Aug. 1998.
14. M. Bellare, J. Kilian, and P. Rogaway. The security of the cipher block chaining message authentication code. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 61(3):362-399, Dec. 2000.
15. M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. The game-playing technique. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/331, Dec. 2004. Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/ 331.
16. B. Blanchet. Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 86-100, May 2004.
17. B. Blanchet. A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/401, Nov. 2005. Available at http://eprint. iacr.org/2005/401.
18. M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic of authentication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A, 426:233-271, 1989.
19. R. Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In FOCS'01, pages 136-145. IEEE, Oct. 2001. An updated version is available at Cryptology ePrint Archive, http://eprint.iacr. org/2000/067.
20. R. Canetti and J. Herzog. Universally composable symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols (the case of encryption-based mutual authentication and key exchange). Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/334, 2004. Available at http: //eprint.iacr.org/2004/334.
21. V. Cortier and B. Warinschi. Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols. In ESOP'05, volume 3444 of LNCS, pages 157-171. Springer, Apr. 2005.
22. A. Datta, A. Derek, J. C. Mitchell, V. Shmatikov, and M. Turuani. Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic. In ICALP'05, volume 3580 of LNCS, pages 16-29. Springer, July 2005.
23. D. E. Denning and G. M. Sacco. Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Commun. ACM, 24(8):533-536, Aug. 1981.
24. S. Halevi. A plausible approach to computer-aided cryptographic proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/181, June 2005. Available at http://eprint. iacr.org/2005/181.
25. J. Herzog. A computational interpretation of Dolev-Yao adversaries. In WITS'03, pages 146-155, Apr. 2003.
26. R. Janvier, Y. Lakhnech, and L. Mazaré. Completing the picture: Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In ESOP'05, volume 3444 of LNCS, pages 172-185. Springer, Apr. 2005.
27. D. E. Knuth and P. B. Bendix. Simple word problems in universal algebras. In Computational Problems in Abstract Algebra, pages 263-297. Pergamon Press, 1970.
28. P. Laud. Handling encryption in an analysis for secure information flow. In ESOP'03, volume 2618 of LNCS, pages 159-173. Springer, Apr. 2003.
29. P. Laud. Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 71-85, May 2004.
30. P. Laud. Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library. In CCS'05, pages 26-35. ACM, Nov. 2005.
31. P. D. Lincoln, J. C. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis. In CCS'98, pages 112-121, Nov. 1998.
32. P. D. Lincoln, J. C. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. Probabilistic polynomial-time equivalence and security protocols. In FM'99, volume 1708 of LNCS, pages 776-793. Springer, Sept. 1999.
33. G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In TACAS'96, volume 1055 of LNCS, pages 147-166. Springer, 1996.
34. P. Mateus, J. Mitchell, and A. Scedrov. Composition of cryptographic protocols in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. In CONCUR'03, volume 2761 of LNCS, pages 327-349. Springer, Sept. 2003.
35. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Completeness theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway logic of encrypted expressions. Journal of Computer Security, 12(1):99-129, 2004.
36. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In TCC'04, volume 2951 of LNCS, pages 133-151. Springer, Feb. 2004.
37. J. Mitchell, A. Ramanathan, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. A probabilistic polynomial-time calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 2006. To appear.
38. R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Commun. ACM, 21(12):993-999, Dec. 1978.
39. R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Authentication revisited. Operating Systems Review, 21(1):7, 1987.
40. D. Otway and O. Rees. Efficient and timely mutual authentication. Operating Systems Review, 21(1):8-10, 1987.
41. A. Ramanathan, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. Probabilistic bisimulation and equivalence for security analysis of network protocols. In FOSSACS'04, volume 2987 of LNCS, pages 468-483. Springer, Mar. 2004.
42. V. Shoup. A proposal for an ISO standard for public-key encryption, Dec. 2001. ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC27.
43. V. Shoup. OAEP reconsidered. Journal of Cryptology, 15(4):223-249, Sept. 2002.
44. C. Sprenger, M. Backes, D. Basin, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Cryptographically sound theorem proving. Unpublished manuscript, Feb. 2006.
45. S. Tarento. Machine-checked security proofs of cryptographic signature schemes. In ESORICS 2005, volume 3679 of LNCS, pages 140-158. Springer, Sept. 2005.
46. T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam. A semantic model for authentication protocols. In IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 178-194, May 1993.