Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 171-182

  Backes, Michael ^a   Pfitzmann, Birgit ^a  

^a IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECRECY; KNOWLEDGE SET; SECRECY VIOLATIONS;

AUTOMATION; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; THEOREM PROVING;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 27544482135     PISSN: 10816011     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.17     Document Type: Conference Paper

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