On distance rationalizability of some voting rules

Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK '09

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 108-117

  Elkind, Edith ^a,b   Faliszewski, Piotr ^c   Slinko, Arkadii ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^d UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISTANCE FUNCTIONS; MAXIMIN; NEW RESULTS; SCORING RULES; SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING RULES; YOUNG'S RULE;

EID: 70350680772     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1562814.1562831     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

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