Determinants of overconfidence and miscalibration: The roles of random error and ecological structure

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 117-137

  Soll, Jack B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030079284     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1996.0011     Document Type: Article

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