Judgments under uncertainty: Representativeness or potential surprise?

British Journal of Psychology

Volumn 93, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 431-449

  Fisk, John E ^a  

^a LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; QUESTIONNAIRE; RANDOMIZATION; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

ADULT; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; QUESTIONNAIRES; RANDOM ALLOCATION; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

EID: 0036877601     PISSN: 20448295     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1348/000712602761381330     Document Type: Article

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