Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 696-713

  Oyama, Daisuke ^a  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Agglomeration; Economic geography; Equilibrium selection; History versus expectations; Perfect foresight dynamics; Potential game; Stability

Indexed keywords

AGGLOMERATION; ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY; MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 70349810953     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2009.07.001     Document Type: Article

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