Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1726-1769

  Oyama, Daisuke ^a   Tercieux, Olivier ^b  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Incomplete information; Iteration; Monotone potential; p Dominance; Perfect foresight dynamics; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649366093     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.03.001     Document Type: Article

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