p-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 288-310

  Oyama, Daisuke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Linear stability; p dominance; Perfect foresight dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036930920     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2955     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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