Stable games and their dynamics

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Sandholm, William H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionarily stable strategies; Evolutionary dynamics; Global stability; Lyapunov functions; Population games

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649342928     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.007     Document Type: Article

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