Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 188-201

  Calabuig, Vicente ^a   Olcina, Gonzalo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Coordination game; Cultural transmission; Migration; Social preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349446276     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.005     Document Type: Article

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