Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 375-402

  Tröger, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Evolution; Forward induction; Hold up problem; Nash Demand Game; Sunk costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036183928     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2803     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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