Cooperation as a transmitted cultural trait

Rationality and Society

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 477-507

  Bisin, Alberto ^a   Topa, Giorgio ^b   Verdier, Thierry ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Cultural transmission; Endogenous preferences; Evolutionary selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 10244234146     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1043463104046695     Document Type: Article

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