Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 67, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 608-623

  Mengel, Friederike ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Cultural evolution; Game theory; Matching structure; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 49049119058     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.001     Document Type: Article

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