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Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 28-53

Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?

Author keywords

Evolution; Fairness; Opportunism; Specific investments

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036205941     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0891     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (34)

References (36)
  • 5
    • 0003724124 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Is There a Hold-up Problem?"
    • Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, No. 357. Stockholm School of Economics
    • (2000)
    • Ellingsen, T.1    Johannesson, M.2
  • 10
    • 0008696154 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Equity Anchoring in Simple Bargaining Games with Production"
    • Discussion Paper 128. Department of Economics, Humboldt University
    • (1998)
    • Gantner, A.1    Güth, W.2    Königstein, M.3
  • 12
    • 0000728879 scopus 로고
    • "Investment and Wages in the Absence of a Binding Contract"
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 449-460
    • Grout, P.1
  • 19
    • 85031460651 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Convergence to Equitable Play in the Repeated Ultimatum Game with Advance Production"
    • Discussion Paper 129. Department of Economics, Humboldt University
    • (1998)
    • Königstein, M.1
  • 31
    • 0003973554 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach"
    • manuscript. ELSE, University College London
    • (2000)
    • Tröger, T.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.