Chapter 21 Experimental Study of Law

Handbook of Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2007, Pages 1619-1650

  Camerer, Colin ^a   Talley, Eric ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Coase theorem; cognitive hierarchy (CH); endowment effect; equilibrium; expected utility (EU); experimental law and economics; experimental methods; generalizability; hindsight bias; judge; jury; norms; quantal response equilibrium (QRE); rational choice; replicability; self serving bias

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649321454     PISSN: 15740730     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0730(07)02021-X     Document Type: Review

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