Market design with endogenous preferences

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 121-153

  Heifetz, Aviad ^a   Segev, Ella ^b   Talley, Eric ^c,d  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY OF ISRAEL   (Israel)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

Endogenous preferences; Market design

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751094360     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.001     Document Type: Article

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