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Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 192-206

Dynamic law enforcement with learning

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4344635493     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh029     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (11)

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