Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 33, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 1507-1519

  Sun, Jerry ^a   Cahan, Steven F ^b   Emanuel, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Compensation committees; Stock option grants

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349166938     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.015     Document Type: Article

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