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Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 53-70

Further evidence on compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation

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EID: 28344454248     PISSN: 00463892     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3666336     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (64)

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