Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 229-239

  Palmon, Oded ^a   Bar Yosef, Sasson ^b   Chen, Ren Raw ^a   Venezia, Itzhak ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Effort aversion; Executive compensation; Managerial incentives; Stock options; Strike prices

Indexed keywords

EID: 38749150037     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.03.015     Document Type: Article

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