Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 486-494

  von Siemens, Ferdinand A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Fairness; Hold up; Reciprocity; Relationship specific investments; Signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349087342     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007     Document Type: Article

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