Does making specific investments unobservable boost investment incentives?

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 911-942

  Sloof, Randolph ^a   Oosterbeek, Hessel ^a   Sonnemans, Joep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35748932023     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00162.x     Document Type: Review

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