Agri-environmental schemes: Adverse selection, information structure and delegation

Ecological Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 2114-2121

  Canton, Joan ^a   De Cara, Stéphane ^b   Jayet, Pierre Alain ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

^b AGROPARISTECH   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Agri environmental policies; Contracts; Delegation; Information structure

Indexed keywords

AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ASYMMETRY;

EID: 64949187832     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.02.007     Document Type: Article

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