Pollution monitoring: Optimal design of inspection - An economic analysis of the use of satellite information to deter oil pollution

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 81-96

  Florens, Jean Pierre ^a   Foucher, Caroline ^a  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DESIGN; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; OIL POLLUTION; POLLUTION MONITORING; REMOTE SENSING;

EID: 0032852701     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1072     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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5. Oil in the Sea: Inputs, Fates, and Effects. 1985;National Academy Press, Washington.
6. G. Perrotta, and, P. Xefteris, Small Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite constellations for tracking oil spills, Alenia Spazio SPA, presented the ERS Thematic Workshop on Oil Pollution Monitoring in the Mediterranean, March 1996.
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9. Xepapadeas A. P. Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard. J. Environ. Econom. Management. 20:1991;113-126.