The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 1039-1048

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a,b   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^c,d   Martimort, David ^c,e  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^d INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^e UNIVERSITÉ DE PAU ET DES PAYS DE L'ADOUR   (France)

Author keywords

Collusion; Costly state verification; Delegation; Endogenous transaction costs

Indexed keywords

TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 0032764231     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00112-3     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Faure-Grimaud, A., Laffont, J.J., Martimort, D., 1998a. A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. Mimeo., IDEI, Toulouse.
2. Faure-Grimaud, A., Laffont, J.J., Martimort, D., 1998b. The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing. Mimeo., IDEI, Toulouse.
3. Gale D., Hellwig M. Incentive compatible debt contract: The one-period problem. Review of Economic Studies. 52:1985;647-663.
4. Kahlil F., Lawarrée J. Collusive auditors. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 85:1996;442-446.
5. Kofman F., Lawarrée J. Collusion in hierarchial agency. Econometrica. 61:1993;629-656.
6. Laffont J.J., Tirole J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 1993;MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
7. Tirole J. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2:1986;181-214.
8. Townsend R. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic Theory. 21:1979;265-293.