Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy

European Economic Review

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 409-435

  Bontems, Philippe ^a   Bourgeon, Jean Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Environmental taxation; Law enforcement; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL TAX; LEGISLATION; POLLUTION TAX;

EID: 11244354439     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00036-9     Document Type: Article

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