Information gathering by a principal

International Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1093-1111

  Nosal, Ed ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750428543     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00407.x     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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5. _, _, AND _, "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered," Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1998b), 163-200.
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11. _, AND _, "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal II: Common Values," Econometrica 60 (1992), 1-42.
12. SOBEL, J., "Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem," International Economic Review 34 (1993), 259-69.