On the use of targeting to reduce moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes

Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 525-540

  Fraser, Rob ^a,b  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ETHICS; TARGETING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 11344285447     PISSN: 0021857X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2004.tb00113.x     Document Type: Article

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