Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments-An experimental study

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 506-525

  Sutter, Matthias ^a,b   Strassmair, Christina ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Collusion; Communication; Experiment; Free riding; Team decision making; Tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 64749095252     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.014     Document Type: Article

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