Do meetings in smoke-filled rooms facilitate collusion?

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 105, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 330-350

  McCutcheon, Barbara ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001276125     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/262075     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; and Stacchetti, Ennio. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games." Manuscript. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., Dept. Econ., May 1989.
2. Baker, Jonathan B. "Identifying Cartel Policing under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939." J. Law and Econ. 32, no. 2, pt. 2 (October 1989): S47-S76.
3. Baxter, William. "The Political Economy of Antitrust." In The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William Baxter, edited by Robert D. Tollison. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1980.
4. Bergin, James, and MacLeod, W. Bentley. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games." Manuscript. Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Univ., Dept. Econ., July 1992.
5. Bernheim, B. Douglas. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry." Rand J. Econ. 15 (Spring 1984): 1-11.
6. Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Ray, Debraj. "Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games." Games and Econ. Behavior 1 (December 1989): 295-326.
7. Binder, John J. "The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Railroad Cartels." J. Law and Econ. 31 (October 1988): 443-68.
8. Blume, Andreas. "Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games." Games and Econ. Behavior 6 (March 1994): 181-211.
9. Bork, Robert H. "Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act." J. Law and Econ. 9 (October 1966): 7-48.
10. Carlton, Dennis W., and Perloff, Jeffrey M. Modern Industrial Organization. 2d ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1994.
11. Domowitz, Ian; Hubbard, R. Glenn; and Petersen, Bruce C. "Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing." Rev. Econ. and Statis. 70 (February 1988): 55-66.
12. Ellert, James C. "Antitrust Enforcement and the Behavior of Stock Prices." Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Chicago, 1975.
13. Elzinga, Kenneth G., and Breit, William. The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1976.
14. Evans, Robert, and Maskin, Eric. "Efficient Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games." Games and Econ. Behavior 1 (December 1989): 361-69.
15. Farrell, Joseph. "Renegotiation in Repeated Oligopoly Interaction." Manuscript. Berkeley: Univ. California, Dept. Econ., April 1994.
16. Farrell, Joseph, and Maskin, Eric. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games." Games and Econ. Behavior 1 (December 1989): 327-60.
17. Fraas, Arthur G., and Greer, Douglas F. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis." J. Indus. Econ. 26 (September 1977): 21-44.
18. Friedman, James W. Oligopoly and the Theory of Games. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977.
19. Fudenberg, Drew, and Maskin, Eric. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information." Econometrica 54 (May 1986): 533-54.
20. Grandy, Christopher. "Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis." J Econ. Hist. 53 (June 1993): 359-76.
21. Green, Edward J., and Porter, Robert H. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information." Econometrica 52 (January 1984): 87-100.
22. Hay, George A. "Practices That Facilitate Cooperation: The Ethyl Case." In The Antitrust Revolution, edited by John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1989.
23. Kauper, Thomas E., and Snyder, Edward A. "Private Antitrust Cases That Follow on Government Cases." In Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning, edited by Lawrence J. White. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
24. Letwin, William. Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1965.
25. Levenstein, Margaret. "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry." Historical Paper no. 50. Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, September 1993.
26. Newmark, Craig M. "Does Horizontal Price Fixing Raise Price? A Look at the Bakers of Washington Case." J. Law and Econ. 31 (October 1988): 469-84.
27. Peltzman, Sam. "George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation." J.P.E. 101 (October 1993): 818-32.
28. Porter, Robert H. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886." Bell J. Econ. 14 (Autumn 1983): 301-14.
29. Posner, Richard A. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement." J. Law and Econ. 13 (October 1970): 365-419.
30. _. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1976.
31. Rubinstein, Ariel. "Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion." J. Econ. Theory 21 (August 1979): 1-9.
32. Salop, Steven C., and White, Lawrence J. "Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework." In Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning, edited by Lawrence J. White. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
33. Sproul, Michael F. "Antitrust and Prices." J.P.E. 101 (August 1993): 741-54.
34. Stigler, George J. "A Theory of Oligopoly. " J.P.E. 72 (February 1964): 44-61.
35. _. "The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws." J. Law and Econ. 9 (October 1966): 225-58.
36. _. The Economist as Preacher, and Other Essays. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1982.
37. _. "The Origin of the Sherman Act." J. Legal Studies 14 (January 1985): 1-12.
38. Telser, Lester G. "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements." J. Bus. 53 (January 1980): 27-44.
39. Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
40. van Damme, Eric. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma." J. Econ. Theory 47 (February 1989): 206-17.